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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
H. C. HARGRAVES, Building Inspector for 8alt Lake City, a
municipal corporation,
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HARRY L. YOUNG, KENNETH L.
ANDERSON and WILLIAIVI
vV..:\-'-LI(ENHORST,
Defendants and Resp,onden.t:s.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO REHEARING

It seerns that the principal argument which counsel
for defendants rnade at the original hearing and now
n1akes relates to his contention that we must decide
whether the carports in question constitute buildings.
This rnerely confuses the issue and is not necessary to
the action of either the District Court or this court.
There are various statutes throughout the country
'v hich state in effect that "no building shall be construct-

.
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ed nearer than X feet to the property line . . . . " However, the ordinance with "\vhich "\Ve are involved here is
patterned after those ordinances which require that side
and rear yards shall be open and unobstructed. There
is nothing in the order of the District Court which says
anything about a building and the District Court and this
court refer to the carports as structures. All the talk,
argument and purported citation of authorities which try
to force us to a determination as to whether these carports are buildings are immaterial and have absolutely
no bearing on the case. In the instant case we feel that
the question of a building being involved is completely
out of the picture and if this is so substantially the entire
argument made by counsel for defendants fails.
Counsel for defendants seem worried because the
decision in this case possibly doesn't decide every question that could arise under the zoning laws in the future.
Of course, we respectfully submit that few court decisions
do settle for all time every question that can arise in relation to the subject of the decision.
Counsel for defendants express concern about what
will happen to clotheslines and ·TV aerials. By analogy
the answer to that can be found in a statement by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Dtl!JJ-

bright Lighting Comp1any v. Missouri, 72 Sup. Crt. 405,
where the court stated:
"Extreme cases are conjured up where an
employer is required to pay wages for a period
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that has no relationship to the legi ti1na te end.
Those cases can await decision as and when they
arise."
\V- e think here that the zoning ordinances have

,,-orked out pretty well and this is perhaps the first case
of this general nature which has arisen in a great many
years. It is doubtful if \Ve need to be unduly apprehensive about a needless stream of litigation because of
the decision in this case. Certainly our experience
doesn't justify such an apprehension.
Of course, in all such matters a line must be drawn
so1nevvhere and \Ve think the legislative body not only
has the authority, but is better equipped than the court
to say where lines shall be drawn. It would perhaps
require considerable argument to justify a fine for going
51 1niles an hour at a given location where everyone was
perrnitted to go 50 miles an hour with i1npunity at the
same location.
Presumably, i_f someone installed a radio antenna in
an area designated as a sideyard little or no complaint
would be made and it is doubtful if police action would
be taken. On the other hand if someone stacked lumber
20 feet high in the entire area from the house to the
property line we think there would be action taken on
the part of the zoning authorities and this in spite of
the vigorous contention of counsel for defendants that
such a stack of lumber couldn't possibly constitute a
building. Thus we see that extreme examples can be
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given which don't solve all the 1nore refined proble1ns.
The point is, ho,vever, that 've dra'v a line and the distance from one inch one side of the line to one inch the
other side of the line is very narrow and the person who
is one inch on the "\vrong side feels terribly aggrieved.
The fact still remains that wherever we project the line
the distance bet,veen the right side and the wrong side
"\vill still be only an inch or two.
As to whether or not we have· questions of p·ublic
health, safety, rnorals and general welfare, we feel that
the legislatures with judicial approval, have given legislative bodies considerable power in the field of zoning.
Since the power does exist there is no justifiable reason
for striking down legislative action even if there is a
difference of opinion between the court and the legislative
body as to whether or not the structures involved in
this, or any other· action, should be permitted or prohibited. A further statement from the case of Daybrigh.t

Lighting Company v. Missouri (sup·ra) fairly states the
proposition in this respect as follows:
"The judgment of the legislature that time
out for voting should cost the e1nployee nothing
may be a debatable one. It is indeed conceded
by the opposition to be such, but if our recent
cases mean anything they leave debatable issues
as respect to business, economic and social affairs
to legislative decision. We could strike down this
law only if we return to the philosophy of the
Lochner, Coppage and Adkins cases."
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Finally, \Ye might point out that which is axiomatic,
na1nely that there must be some very excellent reasons
for the granting of a rehearing. This court in the case
of Cnnunings v. Nelson at 129 Pac. 619 had this to say
about rehearings:

"\V e desire to add a word in conclusion respecting the numerous applications for rehearings
in this court. To make an application for a rehearing is a matter of right, and we have no desire to discourage the practice of filing petitions
for rehearings in proper cases. When this court,
however, has considered and decided all of the
1naterial questions involved in a case, a rehearing
should not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or over looked some rna terial fact or
facts, or have overlooked some statute or decision
which may affect the result, or that "\Ve have based
the decision on some wrong principle of law, or
have either misapplied or overlooked something
which materially affects the result. In this case
nothing was done or attempted by counsel, except
to reargue the very propositions we had fully
considered and decided. If we should write opinions on all the petitions for rehearings filed, we
would have to devote a very large portion of our
time in answering counsel's contentions a second
time; and, if we should grant rehearings because
they are demanded, we should do nothing else
save to write and rewrite opinions in a few cases.
Let it again be said that it is conceded, as a matter
of course, that we cannot convince losing counsel
that their contentions should not prevail, but in
making this concession let it also be remembered
that we, and not counsel, must ultimately assume
all responsibility with respect to whether our
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conclusions are sound or unsound. Our endeavor
is to determine all cases correctly upon the la ".
and the facts, and, if we fail in this, it is because
we are incapable of arriving at just conclusions.
As a general rule, therefore, merely to reargue
the grounds originally presented can be of little,
if any, airl to us."
We

~ee

nothing in the present case that qualifies

it for a rehearing under the require1nents above set forth.
Thus for the reasons stated herein we feel that the petition for a rehearing in this matter should be denied.
· Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENS·EN, HOLMGREN
& CHRIST.OFFIERSEN
414 City and County Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
.Attorneys for Plaintiff Grnd
Appellant
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